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Abstract
There is growing evidence that the European Union (EU) is becoming
more involved in human rights protection and has the capacity to
turn into an unprecedented post-national human rights protection
institution. Based on that evidence, this article suggests different
arguments in favour of a further development in this direction.
These arguments stem not only from a general global justice approach
to post-national institutions’ responsibilities, but also from the concept
of human rights itself and the specific needs of human rights protection
at the post-national level. The EU’s institutional framework presents
advantages that fit the general criteria of institutional design in the
human rights context. Of course, many doubts and critiques may be
raised against an entity which started primarily as a functional and
economic institution, and important reforms, some of which are
ventured in the present article, are still needed to get the EU closer
to this institutional ideal. More generally, the article emphasises the
unique example and precedent the EU may constitute for normative
institutional thinking about global justice at the post-national level.
* PhD (Bern), Dr.iur. (Fribourg), M.Jur. (Oxon.), lic.iur. (Fribourg and Vienna). Professor of
International Law and European Law, Law Faculty, University of Fribourg. This article was
written within the framework of the Project for a European Philosophy of European Law
funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (http://fns.unifr.ch/peopel). I would like to
thank Franziska Martinsen, MA (Berlin) for her research assistance on an early draft of the
article. Many thanks are also due to two anonymous referees whose comments have helped
me clarify the article.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Human Rights Law Review 6:2 (2006),323^360
 at Universite de Fribourg on Septem
ber 19, 2011
hrlr.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1. Introduction
Despite what some may argue, economic integration is to a large extent
exhausted as a vision for further integration in the European Union (EU1).2
A new vision is yet to be found. Since 2000, human rights3 have become
an increasingly important element of institutional activity and constitutional
construction in Europe.4 Reinforced by the adoption of the EU Fundamental
Rights Charter (‘Charter’) in 2000 and its constitutionalisation in the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE) in 2004, human rights now truly
lie at the heart of the Union’s values and objectives (see Articles I-2, I-3 and I-9,
TCE).The prospects of enlargement have further contributed in the last few years
to identifying national, regional and global threats to human rights and hence
to conscientise the EU’s vision of itself as a global entity, whose ‘one boundary
is democracy and human rights’.5 True, the constitutionalisation process
seems currently to have come to a halt, but this is likely to be only temporary.6
Moreover, even if it remains non-binding, it is unlikely that the Charter would be
1 In the present article, the terms ‘European law’ or ‘EU law’ refer to the law of the Treaties on
the European Union, including the law of the European Community. Although in many cases,
European law will in fact be EC law, I will refer for reasons of clarity to European or EU law
in general. For the same reasons, I will often refer to the European Union to talk of what
has now become the Union.
2 von Bogdandy, ‘The EU as a Human Rights Organisation?çHuman Rights and the Core of
the European Union’, (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 1307 at 1337.
3 In this article, I will use ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’ interchangeably, although
international human rights are usually said to have a larger scope than national fundamental
rights. Indeed, in the EU context, the distinctions between national and international
human rights protection, on the one hand, and between Member States’ constitutional
fundamental rights traditions, EC fundamental rights qua general principles of EC law
and the European Convention of Human Rights, on the other, have become moot. It is true
that the distinction between human rights and fundamental rights is also often used to
emphasise the legal nature of fundamental rights, and in particular to distinguish between
moral human rights and constitutional fundamental rights. However, since human rights can
be regarded as the most encompassing group, the concept will generally be used as a default
concept.
4 See, for example, Lenaerts, ‘Fundamental Rights in the European Union’, (2000) 25 European
Law Review 575; De Burca, ‘Human Rights: The Charter and Beyond’, Jean Monnet Working
Paper 10/2001; Beaumont, ‘Human Rights: Some Recent Developments and Their Impact
on Convergence and Divergence of Law in Europe’, in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (eds),
Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) 151;
Ku« hling, ‘Grundrechte’, in von Bogdandy (ed.), Europa« isches Verfassungsrecht, Theoretische und
Dogmatische Grundzu« ge (Berlin: Springer, 2003) 583; Dutheil de la Roche' re, ‘The EU and the
Individual: Fundamental Rights in the Draft Constitutional Treaty’, (2004) 41Common Market
Law Review 345; Alston and de Schutter, ‘Introduction: Addressing the Challenges
Confronting the EU Fundamental Rights Agency’, in Alston and de Schutter (eds),
Monitoring Fundamental Rights in the EU, The Contribution of the Fundamental Rights Agency
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2005) 1.
5 Declaration of the Laeken Council, available at: http://european-convention.eu.int/pdf/
LKNEN.pdf.
6 Declaration by the Heads of State or Government of the Member States of the European Union
on the ratification of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for EuropeçEuropean Council,
16 and 17 June 2005. Available at: http://www.eu2005.lu/en/actualites/conseil/2005/06/
17conseur-decl/index.html.
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revoked and there is no reason to believe that it will not continue to produce
the increasingly important effects it already has had on political and judicial
practice at national and EU levels, but also beyond as exemplified in the
European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) recent case law.7 Finally, now that
the principle that the EU should seek accession to the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR)8 has finally been materially accepted by the Member
States through Article I-9, TCE after 25 years of discussion,9 it is difficult
to see how such a politically important decision could simply not be acted
upon in the near future.
It should come as no surprise therefore that, in response to the question
von Bogdandy provocatively raised five years ago as to whether the EU was
or could be what he referred to as a ‘human rights organisation’,10 arguments
in favour of the EU developing into a global or post-national11 human rights
organisation, regime or framework now abound.12 If this may be an object
of concern for those who regret the ad nauseam analysis of the human
rights issue in the EU,13 or to those who regard the whole debate as closed
by the constitutionalisation of the Charter, others argue, on the contrary,
that ‘the best is yet to come’ in terms of human rights protection in the EU.14
What most of these arguments leave open, however, is what it is precisely that
we should understand by a global ‘human rights organisation’, ‘framework’
or ‘regime’ and how these terms differ from one another. Without a clear
idea of what should constitute post-national human rights protection and
7 See, for example, Eeckhout, ‘The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal
Question’, (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 945; Jacobs, ‘Human Rights in the EU: The
Role of the Court of Justice’, (2001) 26 European Law Review 331. See, for example, C-112/00,
Schmidberger Internationale Transporte and Planzu« ge v Austria [2003] ECR I-5659;
and Application Nos 52562/99 and 52620/99, Soerensen and Rasmussen v Denmark Decision
of the European Court of Human Rights of 11 January 2006.
8 ETS No. 5
9 See Dutheil de la Roche' re, supra n. 4 at 352^3; and Lawson,‘Human Rights: The Best isYet to
Come’, (2005) 1 European Constitutional Law Review 27 at 31^3.
10 von Bogdandy, supra n. 2.
11 In this article, I am using the term ‘post-national’ as a generic term to mean strictly
‘non-national’. It should not be taken to mean that post-national law supplants and replaces
national law, as ‘supranational’ law would; it can, and should, coexist with national law.
Moreover, ‘post-national’ law is broader than ‘international’ law as it does not have the
specific meaning of ‘between States’ and captures any laws amongst States, individuals
and/or other kinds of entities such as international organisations and NGOs.
12 See, for example, Alston and Weiler, ‘An ‘‘Ever Closer Union’’ in Need of a Human Rights
Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’, in Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 3; Eeckhout, supra n. 7; Williams, ‘The
(Im)possibility of the European Union as a Global Human Rights Regime’, in Brownsword
(ed.), Global Governance and the Quest for Justice, Volume IV: Human Rights (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2004) 69, who speaks interchangeably of a human rights ‘regime’, ‘organisation’,
‘framework’or ‘policy’.
13 See Weiler, ‘European Citizenship and Human Rights’, in Winter et al. (eds), Reforming the
Treaty of the European Union (The Hague: Kluwer International Law, 1996) 57 at 77.
14 Lawson, supra n. 9 at 27.
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an account of what we should expect from an institution15 of human rights
protection, it is difficult to assess the EU in this light. This article will suggest
a way in which institutional design and responsibilities can be conceptualised
in the post-national context of human rights protection. Another difficulty
with current accounts of human rights protection in the EU is that they mostly
restrict themselves to a descriptive account of new developments in the field of
EU human rights protection and omit a normative argument as to why these
developments are desirable in the first place in the current global context.16
In the present article, therefore, I would like to argue that the EU not only has
the capacity, but that it should in fact become a new kind of a post-national
human rights institution lato sensu. This article is an extension of a first
and general argument for a conception of the EU qua a post-national institution
of global justice.17 It applies some of the normative considerations developed
in that argument to the institutional responsibilities of the EU as a new form
of post-national human rights institution.18 This article also draws on human
rights theories to develop adequate criteria for the design of institutions of
human rights protection, criteria which can then be applied to the EU to
assess its transformations in the field of human rights protection and the
scope for reform of its organs. Arguments go both ways, however, and if human
rights theories apply to the EU and justify some institutional reforms, the EU
also constitutes an interesting paradigm of a global multi-level human rights
15 In the present article, I am using the term ‘institution’ in a generic political sense to encom-
pass all legally organised entities, such as organisations, etc., as well as their inner ‘organs’,
such as parliamentary assemblies, committees of ministers, etc., and inner ‘bodies’ such as
consultative agencies or committees. As such, this use of the term should not be identified
with the specific legal use of the term within EU law where the EU is an ‘organisation’
composed of organs which are referred to as ‘institutions’ (Article 7, ECT) as well as of
various ‘bodies’ such as the Committee of Regions. A human rights ‘institution’ can then be
said to dispose of a legally structured ‘framework’ in which a certain ‘regime’of human rights
can be enforced. I will come back to the exact definition of human rights institution below.
16 von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 andWilliams, supra n. 12 are exceptions.
17 Besson, ‘The European Union Qua Global Justice Agent’ [forthcoming]. In the present
article, I am referring to the EU as a post-national institution and legal order; it is indeed
neither a supranational European State and State-like legal order (among others it lacks a
demos and coercive force), nor a mere international organisation and legal order (evidence
for this may be found in the primacy and direct effect of EU law, majority voting, the ECJ’s
compulsory jurisdiction, etc.). Space precludes discussing these issues anew in this article,
but see for a discussion of the post-national nature of the EU and its law,Weiler and Wind,
‘Introduction: European Constitutionalism beyond the State’, in Weiler and Wind (eds),
European Constitutionalism Beyond the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
1; Walker, ‘Post-National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’, in Weiler and
Wind (eds), ibid., 27; and Shaw and Wiener, ‘The Paradox of the ‘European Polity’, in Green
Cowles and Smith (eds), The State of the European Union, Vol. 5 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000) 64.
18 The present article refers to ‘obligations’, ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ interchangeably in the
context of global justice. See O’Neill, ‘Global Justice: Whose Obligations?’, in Chatterjee (ed.),
The Ethics of Assistance: Morality and the Distant Needy (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2004) 242 at 248.
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institutionwhich could then be used as a source of inspiration for further global
institutional developments.
The present article is structured so as to reflect the different layers in
the argument. In Section 2, it is important to start by presenting a few
methodological considerations underlying the article’s approach, and in
particular, the dialectical relationship between human rights practice and
normative considerations. Section 3 discusses issues pertaining to the theory
and reality of human rights, in order to dissociate the existence of human
rights from their institutional effectivity and to unpack the relationship between
the content of human rights and the design of those institutions which will
be vested with their protection. In Section 4, I would like to discuss the
institutional dimension of human rights protection, and in particular define
some ideal characteristics of a global human rights institutional framework.
Section 5 assesses the current situation in terms of human rights protection
in the EU and evidence that the EU is developing a stronger human rights
protection framework. Section 6 discusses arguments for the development of
the EU qua a human rights institution, before considering ways in which that
framework may be improved to match the characteristics of an ideal human
rights institution and how one may hope to develop a new kind of human
rights institution in the EU.
2. Methodological Considerations
The connection between human rights theories19 and observations pertaining
to the global institutional responsibilities of the EU raises complex methodo-
logical issues.20 Most ideal normative questions ‘lead to normative-pragmatic
questions belonging to non-ideal theory, especially of how best to construct
and establish global institutions securing global justice’.21 True, one may argue
19 For reasons of clarity, and in order to comply with most authors’ choice in the matter
(see, for example, O’Neill, supra n. 18; and Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights
(New York: Polity Press, 2002)), I am not distinguishing between demands of justice and
human rights in this article, although demands of justice have a broader scope and
encompass demands that are not strictly rights-based. A reason for not distinguishing
them too closely lies in the development of the theory of universal human rights and
obligations, and hence of accounts of the institutional dimension of the fulfilment of those
obligations. See Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibility’, in de Greiff and Cronin
(eds), Global Justice (Cambridge, MA/London: MIT Press, 2002) 151; Beitz, ‘What Human
Rights Mean’, (2003) 132:1 Daedalus 36; and Beitz, ‘Human Rights and the Law of Peoples’,
in Chatterjee (ed.), supra n. 18, 193. See, however, on the importance of the distinction,
Griffin, ‘Discrepancies Between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the
International Law of Human Rights’, (2001) 101 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1; and
Tasioulas, ‘Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: Retracing Griffin’s
Steps’, (2002) 10 European Journal of Philosophy 79.
20 This section is largely inspired by the methodological considerations in Besson, supra n. 17.
21 Gosepath, ‘The Global Scope of Justice’, in Pogge (ed.), Global Justice (Cambridge: Blackwell,
2001) 145.
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that these theories have different audiences and that generally political
theory should be kept distinct from politics. However, the distance can become
so great that it impairs the capacity of theory to provide a useful assessment
of existing institutional arrangements and to have an impact on them.22
A dynamic and reflexive approach is clearly needed, therefore, in order to
discuss the aspects of human rights protection which reflect both normative
demands and the existing political structure in Europe.23 A combination
between a ‘top to bottom’and a ‘bottom to top’approach is required that allows
for a certain influence of the post-national political and legal reality on
normative considerations, while also, in turn, constraining that institutional
reality with those very normative considerations.24 The ‘top to bottom’approach
is of crucial importance for the definition of those appropriate normative goals
which might then be realised by real institutional reforms.25 Drawing normative
rules from an existing institutional reality would indeed fall prey to the
naturalistic fallacy. The‘bottom to top’approach is, however, of equal pertinence.
Normative theory can only reform what there is and hence needs to rely
on accurate empirical data.26 Moreover, normative theory looks for certain
recognisable phenomena, such as legitimating consensus, and the feasibility of
these phenomena depends on an assessment of existing practical constraints.27
It is therefore very important to strike the right balance between ‘top to
bottom’ and ‘bottom to top’ approaches to global justice and human rights, in
order to avoid the Charybdis of empty ethical universalism, on the one hand, or
the Scylla of insufficiently demanding particularism, on the other.28 As Beitz
rightly argues,
[t]heory has to begin somewhere. We begin with the observation that
there is an international practice of human rights, and we ask some
distinctively theoretical questions. [. . .] Whereas present practice is the
beginning, it need not be the end; in fact, it would be surprising if a
22 See Pogge and Barry, ‘Introduction: Global Institutions and Responsibilities’, (2005) 36
Metaphilosophy 1.
23 See Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press, 1971); and Follesdal,
‘Legitimacy Theories of the European Union’, ARENAWorking Paper 04/15.
24 See Gosepath, supra n. 21; and Gosepath, ‘Globale Gerechtigkeit und Subsidiarita« t.
Zur internen Beschra« nkung einer subsidia« ren und fo« deralenWeltrepublik’, in Gosepath and
Merle (eds),Weltrepublik: Globalisierung und Demokratie (Mu« nchen:Verlag Beck, 2002) 74. See
also in the European context, Nicola€|dis and Lacroix, ‘Order and Justice Beyond the Nation-
State: Europe’s Competing Paradigms’, in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in
International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 125 at 128, whose alternative
paradigms both reflect and constrain European reality.
25 See Gosepath, ‘Globale Gerechtigkeit’, ibid. at 74.
26 See Gosepath, ibid. at 75; and Hurrell,‘Order and Justice in International Relations:What is at
Stake?’, in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International Relations (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2003) 24 at 34.
27 See Gosepath, ibid.; and Follesdal, supra n. 23.
28 See Pogge and Barry, supra n. 22 at 2.
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critical theory of human rights did not argue for revisions in the
practiceçconceivably substantial ones. [. . .] To dismiss the practice
because it doesn’t conform to a received philosophical construction
seems to me dogmatic in the most unconstructive way.29
The advantage of the proposed combined approach to institutions lies in its
reflexivity. Institutions are not seen as static, self-interested and amoral entities
within the transnational sphere, while moral principles do not appear as castles
in the air without any connexion to real phenomena. In fact, institutions
can actually reflect, as well as shape, perceptions of human rights, and their
role is crucial with regard to human rights concerns beyond the State.30 In this
context, the EU can be used as a pioneering example against which one should
test institutional concerns in the human rights context, without, however,
necessarily being taken as an absolute model and an optimal outcome, given
the constant need for institutional reform.31
3. TheTheory and Reality of Human Rights
Before turning to the institutional dimension of human rights protection,
it is important to clarify the relationship between the existence of human
rights and their institutional effectivity. To do so, I will start with a few
considerations in human rights theory and will then turn to the difficult
question of the reality of human rights.32
A. TheTheory of Human Rights
A discussion of the institutional implications of human rights protection at a
global level requires a precise account of human rights per se. Scope precludes
providing an exhaustive account here, but a few remarks are in order.33
Although human rights constitute an uncontestable part of
contemporary law and politics, their positive guarantees are largely general
and vague and their exact nature and consequences remain, as a result,
29 Beitz, ‘What Human Rights Mean’, supra n. 19 at 46.
30 See Nicola€|dis and Lacroix, supra n. 24 at 153.
31 Ibid. at 137.
32 Of course, the distinction between the theory and the reality of human rights is slightly
artificial, since their theoretical justifications affect their reality and their reality should feed
their theoretical conceptualisations. See Nickel, Making Sense of Human Rights: Philosophical
Reflections on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1987); and Griffin, ‘First Steps in an Account of Human Rights’, (2001) 9 European
Journal of Philosophy 306.
33 See Besson, The Morality of Conflict. Reasonable Disagreement and the Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2005) at Chapter 12 for a more extensive discussion of human rights theory.
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controversial in moral theory.34 In what follows, I understand human rights
primarily as rights, albeit of a special kind and of a special intensity.35 In a
nutshell, human rights are the rights human beings have simply by virtue of
being human.36 As such, they are rights which protect fundamental universal
and general interests. Human rights, like rights, can be understood as a
normative relationship between an addressee and a beneficiary that has a
certain object.37 Whereas beneficiaries are mostly individuals, addressees
may be both individuals and institutional agents.38 Even when human rights’
addressees are individuals, institutions are usually vested with parallel
positive duties to prevent human rights violations among individuals. These
imply setting up judicial remedies, but also taking legislative and executive
measures. As such, the institutional dimension of human rights is always
implied in the interactional account of human rights defended here.39
Producing an introductory account of the nature of human rights is made
even more difficult as the relationship between moral and legal rights itself is
unclear. Some theories of rights assume that everything that is said about
rights applies equally to moral and legal rights, whereas other theories have
concentrated on either moral rights40 or legal rights.41 In this article, I propose
an explanation of human rights in general which can be applied to moral
and legal rights equally, with the latter ensuring the legal recognition of
some protected interests besides other institutional rights.42 In the following
discussion, I will distinguish between fundamental moral rights and their
recognition through legal rights.
34 See, for example, Nickel, supra n. 32; Nickel, ‘Human Rights’, in Zalta (ed.), Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, available at: http://plato.stanford.edu; and Nickel, Making Sense
of Human Rights, 2nd edn (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004).
35 Unless specified, references to ‘rights’ encompass ‘human rights’ in what follows.
36 Compare, however, Pogge,World Poverty and Human Rights, supra n. 19, who understands
‘human rights’ not as a special kind of rights, but as a new self-standing notion. See Besson,
‘Human Rights, Institutional Duties and Cosmopolitan Responsibilities’, (2003) 23 Oxford
Journal of Legal Studies 507 for a critique.
37 See, for example, Alexy, ‘Die Institutionalisierung der Menschenrechte im demokratischen
Verfassungsstaat’, in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds), Die Philosophie der Menschenrechte
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997) 244.
38 Compare, however, Pogge,World Poverty and Human Rights, supra n. 19, who refers to Rawls,
The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999) and his institutional
account of justice and human rights.
39 On the opposition between interactional and institutional accounts of human rights,
see Pogge, ‘On the Site of Distributive Justice: Reflections on Cohen and Murphy’, (2000)
29 Philosophy and Public Affairs 137. Compare Cohen, ‘Where the Action Is: On the Site
of Distributive Justice’, (1997) 26 Philosophy and Public Affairs 3; and Murphy, ‘Institutions
and the Demands of Justice’, (1998) 27 Philosophy and Public Affairs 251.
40 See Tugendhat, ‘Die Kontroverse um die Menschenrechte’, in Gosepath and Lohmann (eds),
supra n. 37, 48.
41 See Hart, ‘Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence’, (1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 49;
and Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning (Westport:
Greenwood, 1978).
42 See Raz, ‘On the Nature of Rights’, (1984) 93 Mind 194.
330 HRLR 6 (2006),323^360
 at Universite de Fribourg on Septem
ber 19, 2011
hrlr.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
(i) Fundamental moral rights
In this section, I will first present a modified account of the interest theory of
rights, before presenting in more detail how rights relate to interests and duties.
The modified interest theory of rights
Three main theories of the nature of rights have been defended with varying
success. The will theory of rights singles out right-bearers by virtue of the
power they have over the duty in question so that their choice is sufficient to
discharge another of the duty requirement.43 There are many difficulties
with this theory, including, most importantly, the fact that it does not allow
discussion about rights in advance of determining who exactly is under the
relevant duty.44 Besides, by allowing right-holders to set aside the duty-bearer’s
duties to respect their rights, the will theory of rights does not account for the
existence of the rights we regard as inalienable and as linked to objective aspects
of our well-being, such as human rights.45 In contrast, according to the interest
theory of rights, a person has a right if an aspect of her well-being (her interest)
is a sufficient reason for holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.46 It is
the most influential theory of rights to date.47 The advantage of the interest
theory of rights is, first, that it makes it possible to argue for the recognition of
a right before specifying which duties correspond to it.48 Second, the interest
theory does not preclude any of the means, and duties, that could help protect
the rightçthus identifying the right with a sufficient ground for holding other
individuals under all the duties necessary, rather than in terms of the details of
these duties.49
Finally, according to the status theory of rights, rights express the recognition
of a person’s status as a being who has a high, even if not an absolute,
level of inviolability.50 The status a right protects is not so much in a person’s
interests, as it is a status that makes her interests worth protecting.
Such a right is based on a person’s status and is not necessarily related to
43 See Hart, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, inWaldron (ed.),Theories of Rights (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1984) 77.
44 See Waldron, ‘Introduction’, in Waldron (ed.), ibid. 1 at 10. See Harel, ‘Theories of Rights’, in
Golding and Edmundson (eds),The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004) 191 at 193^7 for a more elaborate discussion and critique of both
models.
45 See Waldron, ibid. at 9.
46 See Raz, supra n. 42 at 195. On the different versions of Raz’s definition of rights, see Kamm,
‘Rights’, in Coleman and Shapiro (eds),The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of
Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 476 at 484 et seq.
47 See MacCormick, ‘Rights in Legislation’, in Raz and Hacker (eds), Law, Morality and Society
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1977) 189 at 192 et seq.
48 Ibid. at 201.
49 SeeWaldron, supra n. 44 at 10^1.
50 See Kamm, ‘Conflicts of Rights. Typology, Methodology and Nonconsequentialism’, (2001) 7
Legal Theory 239 at 242^7; and Kamm, supra n. 46 at 492^3.
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any aspect of her well-being.51 An interpretation of the status theory (modified
interest theory) allows us to keep an interest-based account of rights while
attenuating some of its consequences. As Kamm rightly argues, applied strictly,
the interest theory of rights is blind to the circumstances in which a right is
infringed.52 A status-based filter on rights therefore permits the application of
the interest theory to be refined to prevent cases of infringement of rights that
would deny any status to the right-holder.53 According to the modified interest
theory of rights, then, most rights are based on interests, but some are aimed at
recognising a person’s status and inviolability which lie at the foundations of her
interests. This is clearly the case for most fundamental rights, whose special
weight does not depend only on the importance of the protected interests, but
also on the fundamental status they protect.54 The modified interest theory
also captures the importance of the so-called fundamental core of human
rights known to certain constitutional traditions in Europe.55
From interests to duties
In the modified interest theory of rights, human rights qua normative relation-
ships are intermediaries between interests and duties.56
Rights are founded on interests. Only interests of ultimate value can found
rights;57 they are interests which are regarded as fundamental for the well-
being of a person. They include individual interests when these constitute a
part of a person’s well-being in an objective sense. They also extend to others’
interests and even to the common good in some cases.58 The fundamental
nature of the protected interests will have to be determined by reference
to the context and time rather than established once and for all.59 For a
right to be recognised, therefore, a sufficient interest must be established
and weighed against other interests and considerations with which it might
conflict in a particular social context.60 This implies that a lot of
51 See Kamm, supra n. 46 at 485.
52 Ibid. at 506 et seq.
53 See Kamm, supra n. 50 at 244.
54 Such a reinterpretation is in line with Raz’s contentions about the relationship between
fundamental or constitutional rights and the common good and the fact that in some
cases the stringency of rights seems greater than the weight of the individual interests
they protect. See Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’, (1992) 5 Ratio Juris 127 at 135; and
Raz, ‘Rights in Politics’, in Tasioulas (ed.), Law, Values and Social Practices (Aldershot,
Dartmouth, 1997) 75 at 83. See also Harel, supra n. 44 at 202.
55 See Besson, supra n. 33.
56 See Raz, supra n. 42 at 208.
57 On the entities which can have such ultimate-valued interests and the nature of these
interests, see Harel, supra n. 44 at 193^7.
58 See Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’, supra n. 54; and Raz, ‘Rights in Politics’,
supra n. 54 at 83.
59 Compare Griffin, supra n. 32.
60 See Raz,Value, Respect and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at 202
on the importance of social practices when defining the scope and content of rights.
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weighing and balancing61 will have to be done before a right is identified, in
order to establish exactly where the special importance of the right lies.62
Rights ground duties. Rights are reasons for holding others in duty. Many
have deduced from this that rights and duties are correlatives. However, the
correlativity between them is not immediate.63 As rights come logically into
existence prior to the specification of the duties they then justify, it is possible
to have rights without duties.64 Of course, once a specific duty is grounded,65
it will be correlative to the specific right which flows from the general right and
which grounds the duty.66 The relationship between rights and duties is
therefore normative or justificatory, rather than symmetrical.67 It follows that a
right might provide for the imposition of many duties and not only one. Besides,
rights have a dynamic nature and, as such, successive specific duties can be
grounded on a right depending on the circumstances.68 One right may therefore
be correlative to many different duties across time.69 This is particularly
important in the case of human rights which are necessarily general and
usually entrenched in long-lasting legal instruments, and can therefore be
specified anew in each concrete case.
In these circumstances, one may wonder why there is a need for rights at
all as intermediaries between interests and duties.70 Interests may indeed
change, thus changing the recognised rights. Rights themselves may change,
thus questioning what had been guaranteed. Finally, duties themselves arise
and change in relation to the need of protection of the recognised interests. In
fact, it is this very dimension of change and conflict which justifies the
recognition of rights. Not only do rights provide a way to save time and energy
in terms of allowing us to rely on the superiority of some interests over others,
but also, and more importantly, they provide us with an intermediary level
61 Hence, the weight or importance of a right depends on the weight or importance of the
interest it protects. Talk of the ‘weight’and ‘balancing’of rights and interests is metaphorical,
of course.
62 See Waldron, supra n. 44 at 14. See also Raz, supra n. 42 at 200 and 209; and Marmor,
‘On the Limits of Rights’, (1997) 16 Law and Philosophy 1 at 10.
63 One may argue that this does not question the Hohfeldian conception of correlativity as the
latter is meant as a stipulation, rather than as an empirical claim. See Raz, ‘Disagreement in
Politics’, (1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 25.
64 It is also possible to have duties without rights. See Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford:
Oxford University, 1995); and Feinberg, ‘In Defense of Moral Rights’, in Feinberg (ed.),
Problems at the Roots of Law: Essays in Legal and Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003) 37.
65 See MacCormick, supra n. 47 at 199-202; Raz, supra n. 42 at 196^200; and Kamm,
supra n. 46 at 480.
66 See Raz, supra n. 63 at 42.
67 See Marmor, supra n. 62 at 3.
68 See Raz, supra n. 42 at 197^9.
69 See Waldron, Liberal Rights: Collected Papers, 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993) at 212 et seq.
70 See Raz, supra n. 42 at 208^9.
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of agreement.71Even if this agreement is not meant to last, it is a base we need to
agree on in order to disagree further, about duties for instance. Onemay even say
it is a way to make sure we disagree further about rights.72 This is particularly
true of fundamental rights, as they recognise and individuate interests
over which we are bound to disagree later and over which we should, in fact,
keep disagreeing.
(ii) Fundamental legal rights
According to Raz, ‘if rights are protected interests in that a person has a right
if and only if an interest of his is a sufficient ground for holding another to be
subject to a duty then legal rights are legally protected interests’.73 According
to this definition, a legal right comes into existence in two steps.74 First of all,
an individual has a right if an interest of hers is sufficient to hold another to be
subject of a duty. Second, her right is a legal right if her interest is recognised
by law, that is, if the law holds her interest to be a sufficient ground to hold
another to be subject to a duty.75 This explains how, in some cases, a legal rule
may seem to be conferring a right in protecting someone’s interest without
necessarily conferring such a right in practice, because there is no such interest
to protect, or at least not in that way. In this case, the valid legal rule has the legal
form of a legal right, but not its content.76
It follows that legal rights may be regarded as moral rights. Of course, not all
moral rights are or should be legally recognised, on the one hand. There can be
moral rights which do not give rise to legal rights. Rights should not, therefore,
necessarily be understood as ‘moral rights to have legal rights’along Feinberg’s
argument.77 Law need not always be a better protection of rights-protected
interests than other means.78 Nor, on the other hand, does this mean that legal
rights necessarily always pre-exist as independent moral rights. Some do and
are legally recognised moral rights, but others are legally created moral
rights.79 In some cases, the law may change a person’s interests, thus in a
sense creating the interest which is the foundation of the right. As Raz puts it,
71 See Marmor, supra n. 62 at 15^6.
72 See Besson, supra n. 33.
73 Raz, ‘Legal Rights’, (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1 at 12.
74 Ibid. at 14.
75 Ibid.
76 See Raz, ‘Reasoning with Rules’, (2001) 54 Current Legal Problems 1 at 6, on the normative
gap that is intrinsic to reasoning with legal rules.
77 See, for example, Feinberg, supra n. 64. See, in the case of human rights, Alexy, supra n. 37;
and Habermas, Die postnationale Konstellation (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
78 See for example,Tasioulas, ‘The Moral Reality of Human Rights’, in Pogge (ed.), Freedom from
Poverty as a Human Right;Who OwesWhat to theVery Poor? (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006) forthcoming;Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
and Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibility’, supra n. 19.
79 See Raz, supra n. 73 at 16^7.
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‘legal obligations are real (moral) duties arising out of the law’.80 The general
account of moral rights defended in the prior section applies therefore to legal
rights whether or not a legal right corresponds to a pre-existing moral right.
So far I have been addressing the issue of legal rights in general. The legal
rights we concern ourselves with in this article are fundamental rights.
Fundamental rights are regarded as more fundamental than other legal rights
because they often protect common goods apart from individual interests.
Besides, even when they protect fundamental interests, they do so in a way that
pays more attention to an individual’s fundamental status and inviolability than
ordinary legal rights.81 They are therefore usually entrenched and protected
from ordinary legislative revisions, either through constitutional protection
at the national level or through human rights treaties and conventions at
the international level. Thus, they differ both formally and substantively from
ordinary legal rights.
B. The Reality of Human Rights
Besides numerous controversies about the exact nature of human rights and
their relationship to interests and duties, it is their relationship to institutional
reality which has recently become the centre of interest. The question that is
commonly raised can be phrased: is the effectivity of human rights a condition
of their existence or rather a consequence?82 We know that human rights have
to be institutionally enforced in practice; it is in fact the whole point of rights to
give rise to obligations to enforce them.We also know, however, that rights are
rarely fully enforced and hence entirely effective in practice. Hence, the concern
about their effectivity and how to connect it back to their very existence.
The question of human rights’ effectivity is particularly relevant for the
institutional design of global human rights protection frameworks such as
that in the EU. The institutional protection of human rights is indeed a central
element of their effectivity. Moreover, in the absence of a global State,
institutional enforcement of human rights at the global level is necessarily less
exhaustive than national mechanisms of enforcement.This gives rise to different
conclusions: either the existing institutional framework at the post-national
80 Ibid. at 16^7.
81 See Raz, ‘Rights and Individual Well-Being’, supra n. 54 at 135 et seq.; and Raz, ‘Rights in
Politics’, supra n. 54 at 83.
82 This question applies to both moral and legal human rights, but mostly to the latter given
the heightened concern for the effectivity of the latter. In fact, the legal translation of human
rights may even be regarded as the first step towards their enforcement. As I explained
before, however, and contrary to authors like Habermas or Alexy, I do not regard the legal
translation of a moral right as an automatic right to legalisation flowing from the existence
of a moral right (i.e. a moral right to X amounts to a moral right to a legal right to X).
In what follows, therefore, I will regard the legalisation of human rights as an important
part of their institutional enforcement and discuss it as a particular instance of the latter.
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level conditions the existence of the human rights we can have or, conversely,
the latter’s existence and content influence the post-national institutions we set
up to protect them. The gist of this article’s argument will obviously depend
on the answer to this question. It is only if human rights can influence the
kind of post-national protection institutions we set up that the whole question
of the ideal institutional design and assessment of the transformation of the
EU human rights protection framework can be raised.
According to some authors, the moral reality of human rights, and hence
their recognition depend on their effectivity in practice. Rights, which are
neither claimable nor executable, are regarded as mere rhetorical or ‘manifesto’
rights. A manifesto right83 is a right which cannot generally be respected at the
time of utterance, whose addressee cannot yet be determined in a secure
manner, and, when she is specified, cannot ensure the respect of the right in a
general fashion. Authors can be split into two groups depending on the degree
of enforceability that they require for rights to exist. According to Feinberg
and O’Neill,84 human rights should be claimable in the sense that there should
be means to claim that they should be respected, whether or not they can then
be respected. However, according to Geuss and James,85 the moral reality of
human rights requires more than mere claimability; it also implies executability.
Of course, this does not imply that human rights need to be executed to exist,
but that this execution should at least be possible. There should be mechanisms
to enforce them effectively and, in particular, institutions, enforcement agents
and the ability for the beneficiaries to require their enforcement.
However, this approach to human rights is too restrictive. True, rights should
be feasible along the lines of the ‘ought implies can’ adage, but feasibility need
not yet mean claimability or effectivity. Effectivity does matter, but it is a require-
ment and hence a consequence of human rights, rather than a condition.
Of course, rights call for respect and hence effectivity, but this is a consequence
of their existence in the first place.86 Confirmation may be found, for instance,
in a reading of Article 28 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 1948
(UDHR).87 This can be explained, first of all, by reference to the relationship
between human rights and duties, which are not absolutely correlative,
but stand in a justificatory relationship. The interest theory of rights implies
the dynamic nature of human rights which pre-exist the specification of the
duties to which they give rise in each case. This excludes, as a consequence,
83 See Feinberg, supra n. 64.
84 See Feinberg, ibid.; O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
and O’Neill, supra n. 18.
85 See Geuss, ‘Outside Ethics’, (2003) 11 European Journal of Philosophy 29; and James, ‘Rights as
Enforceable Claims’, [2003] Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 133.
86 See Nickel, supra n. 32 at 35: ‘Legal enforcement is often important to making rights
effective, but such enforcement is not essential to the existence of rights’.
87 GA Res. 217A (III), 10 December 1948, A/810 at 7.
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the logical dependence of the existence of rights on the enforcement of the duties
they give rise to. It is important to distinguish a human right from the reasons it
creates.88 Moreover, not all rights are claim-rights; liberties and immunities,
for instance, cannot be claimed at all. Finally, there are many ways of claiming
rights andmany need not be institutionalised at all.89 Thus, wemayhave human
rights no one can as yet fulfil entirely and which may later impose duties on
institutions which cannot yet comply with those duties, provided all available
and capable institutions can be asked to do their best to respect them. It is impor-
tant, therefore, not to confuse the existence of a human right with the enforce-
ment of that right. Human rights’ institutional reality stems from their moral
reality, but is not one of its conditions.
4. Human Rights and Post-National Institutions
Although neither executability nor claimability are conditions of the recogni-
tion of human rights, they constitute its primary normative consequence.
Human rights give rise to duties of enforcement, which should be optimised
in each case. And this is precisely why the institutional design and allocation
of responsibilities among potential agents is crucial to the realisation of those
duties. As such, it is essential to establish criteria of institutional design which
can then be used to assess the qualityof human rights’ institutional enforcement
in practice.90 In this section, I will address the question of the design of post-
national human rights institutions in a general fashion.91 To do so, the section
starts by discussing the different institutional agents of protection of human
rights and the scope and allocation of their responsibilities, before addressing
the issue of institutional design stricto sensu.
A. Human Rights and Institutional Agency
Among the different types of post-national human rights institutions, one
should distinguish between primary and secondary agents. According to
O’Neill, primary agents are those who have the capacity to determine how
human rights are to be institutionalised within a certain domain. In contrast,
secondary agents are those agents constructed by primary agents to meet the
demands of justice set by them, most evidently by conforming to any legal
88 See Tasioulas, supra n. 78; Pogge, ‘Human Rights and Human Responsibility’, supra n. 19;
and Griffin, supra n. 32.
89 See Nickel, supra n. 32.
90 In contrast, for those authors who link the existence of rights to their institutional
effectivity, rights cannot influence normatively the institutions we have, since they would
not exist without effective institutions. See, for example, O’Neill, supra n. 18.
91 This section, with the exception of C, is largely inspired by Besson, supra n. 17.
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requirements they establish.92 Typically, primary agents have means of
coercion by which they control the action of secondary agents.
Curiously, most cosmopolitan theories of human rights assume that
global duties stop at State boundaries, or at least that, when they extend to
post-national institutions, these are, at most, regarded as secondary agents of
justice with secondary obligations.93 The UDHR, for instance, refers mostly to
States as addressees of their corresponding obligations.94 True, practice shows
that States remain central agents of justice despite intensive global changes.
Globalisation is, however, currently reconfiguring power.95 Transnational
harm is no longer the only global harm one may be concerned about.96
Moreover, States can be weak and incapable of action. Even when such States
are strong enough, they can no longer guarantee the protection of their citizens’
and others’ human rights on their own under circumstances of
intensive globalisation.97 States can therefore no longer be deemed the sole and
primary agents of human rights protection and redress in operation regarding
transnational or other harms.98 Many non-State agents like NGOs, but also
transnational, international and post-national institutions, whose contribution
to justice is not regulated, defined and allocated by States only, and which
can therefore function as primary agents of justice, can now contribute to the
protection of human rights.
For obvious reasons, post-national institutional agency in the human rights
context cannot be understood along the same lines as national agency. It is
important, therefore, to delineate its contours in more detail. These are bound
to be controversial, however. A working definition one may suggest is: any
collective institutional structure that purports to intervene in human rights
matters regardless of jurisdiction and which, itself, regards human rights
as its key principle of governance.99 These post-national institutional actors
include non-governmental transnational agencies, such as NGOs, as well as
governmental transnational, international or supranational organisations.
These potentially encompass the United Nations, the Council of Europe and
other regional entities active in the human rights context. The question I will
address later in this article is whether the EU can be deemed as one of them.
92 See O’Neill, ‘Agents of Justice’, in Pogge (ed.), supra n. 21, 188 at 189.
93 See O’Neill, supra n. 18 at 242^4 and 249.
94 Ibid. at 243.
95 Ibid. at 256.
96 See Foot, ‘Introduction’, in Foot, Gaddis and Hurrell (eds), Order and Justice in International
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 1 at 4^5.
97 See O’Neill, supra n. 18 at 246^7.
98 See Foot, supra n. 96; and Hurrell, supra n. 26.
99 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 70 who restricts, however, his definition to ‘State agreed’
structures. This restriction does not fit the post-national approach chosen in the present
article.
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B. Human Rights and Institutional Responsibility
There is nothing unusual about ascribing obligations to institutions or groups
of individuals. Like individuals, institutional and collective agents bring
cognitive and decision-making capacities to bear on choices that initiate action
and affect what happens.100 In this sense, non-State institutions do not differ
from States.
If non-State institutional and collective agents can bear obligations of justice,
it is important to distinguish the identification and scope of institutional
obligations from the allocation of those obligations among institutions, although
most of the time both issues will be interrelated in practice.101The answer to the
question of which obligations should be borne by which agent in a concrete case
will depend on the relationship between the propositional content of human
rights and the actual capacities of the putative agent.102 According to the
interest-based theory of rights propounded here,103 specific obligations to
respect the same general rights and underlying obligations need not always be
the same, depending both on the circumstances and the specific agents targeted.
Accordingly, the agents who ought to carry out specific obligations are those
which, beside other conditions,104 can do so, and this specification of duties
will depend on the circumstances in each case.105
The allocation of duties mirrors the relationship between obligations
and capacities. It is not enough simply to assume that there will always be an
effective and decent State to assign obligations of justice to other institutions.
Any adequate assignment of obligations must allocate specific obligations to
those with the necessary powers and skills to fulfil them.106 The reverse is also
true: weak States cannot coherently be required to carry out tasks for which
they are not competent. It is crucial, in view of these new circumstances, to
accommodate new institutional agents in cosmopolitan theories of justice
and to account for a plurality of agents of human rights protection that
can fulfil their duties at the different levels at which they can be fulfilled most
efficiently.107 This idea of a network of human rights protection institutions
is exemplified, as we will see, in the EU, which combines post-national,
transnational and national institutional layers.108
100 See O’Neill, supra n. 18 at 249.
101 Ibid. at 248.
102 Ibid. at 245.
103 See, for example, Raz, supra n. 42; and Tasioulas, supra n. 78.
104 These conditions include among others the existence of an objective interest fundamental
enough to hold someone else in duty: see, for example, Raz, supra n. 42.
105 See Besson, supra n. 33 at Chapter 12.
106 See O’Neill, supra n. 18 at 250^1. See also Gosepath, supra n. 21 at 163.
107 O’Neill, supra n. 18 at 250 and 258.
108 See, on the idea of a network of global institutions, Dryzek, ‘Deliberative Democracy in
Divided Societies. Alternatives to Agonism and Analgesia’, (2005) 33 Political Theory 218;
and Archibugi, ‘Cosmopolitan Democracy and Its Critics: A Review’, (2004) 10 European
Journal of International Relations 437.
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C. Human Rights and Institutional Design
As I have explained before, the existence of human rights qua protected
interests does not depend on their institutional effectivity, but does give rise
to duties of institutional enforcement. As we have just seen, the scope and
allocation of these duties depend, on the one hand, on the interests protected
by the human rights in each case and, on the other, on the capacities of the
putative responsible agents. Adequate institutional design and the identification
and enhancement of the capacities of the putative responsible agents to abide
by their duties are crucial to an optimised realisation of those duties. After a
short discussion of the idea of institutional design itself, I will define different
criteria which might be used to assess an ideal institutional framework of
human rights protection.
(i) Institutional design in general
Institutional design is best understood as a reflexive and dialectical exercise.
It anticipates, first of all, what protected interests might generally require
in order to increase the capacities of institutions to protect those interests and
try to comply in advance with what might be demanded of these institutions.
In a second stage, it looks back to the enforcement of the duties generated in
concrete circumstances, to improve future designs. It amounts, in other words,
to a ‘back and forth’ exercise between institutional practice and normative
theory; the former influences the latter, but the latter should also condition the
former.
While this dialectical approach to institutional design is clearly at work
at the national level, where years of institutional experience have helped
refine institutional frameworks, things are slightly more complex at the
post-national level, where the process of mutual adjustment has only just
started. Based on the proposed interest-based account of human rights and
institutional responsibility, the institutional needs raised by existing human
rights can easily be anticipated. It is clear, for instance, that the predominantly
liberal rights one finds in current human rights protection instruments
have had an influence on post-national institutional design which is almost
purely judiciary-based. In fact, the wedge drives both ways. One may, for
instance, revise existing human rights instruments to generate more proactive
institutional frameworks. Thus, the emergence of new human rights,
such as social rights, has already given rise to new agencies in human rights
protection, and in particular to the development of NGOs, which are more
able to enforce those rights than other existing post-national institutions.
In this respect, it is interesting to assess the types of human rights the
EU might be able to protect and how its institutions could be reformed to do
this best.
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Following a constructivist approach, it can be said that institutions to be set
up in the future can be ‘catalysts for change and agents of change, rather than
unitary entities with fixed preferences that are difficult to change’.109 Some
authors like Kostakopoulou actually emphasise that agents
have the capacity to capitalise on the normative surplus of meaning
and the progressive possibilities already present in accepted logics and
existing conceptual resources nested within institution in order to
develop new conceptions. [. . .] [Institutional change] is [. . .] more fluid,
contingent, unpredictable and [. . .] transformative.110
This fluidity of institutional change reflects the dynamic nature of human rights
and the many ways in which they can be protected.111
(ii) Institutional criteria in the human rights context
Different criteria for institutional design in the human rights context may
be suggested. Specific constitutive elements of a post-national human rights
institution should be defined if one is to assess existing institutions and propose
new reforms to fit this ideal. As discussed before, a working definition of a
human rights institution might be any collective institutional structure that
purports to intervene in human rights matters regardless of jurisdiction and
which itself regards human rights as its key principle of governance.112
Accordingly, we may define at least five general criteria which are constitutive
of a good post-national human rights institution. Further criteria may be
delineated in each case by reference to the specifically protected interests and
the duties they give rise to in given circumstances.
Institutional structure
This first criterion is relatively straightforward. I have already discussed the
external scope of institutional agency and the difference between primary
and secondary institutional agents and will not come back to these issues here.
What needs to be addressed, however, is the internal organisation of post-
national human rights institutions. It may mirror a State with a combination
109 Kostakopoulou, ‘Ideas, Norms and European Citizenship: Explaining Institutional Change’,
(2005) 68 Modern Law Review 233 at 236. Kostakopoulou argues against Checkel,
‘The Constructivist Turn in International Relations’, (1998) 50 World Politics 324, that
institutional (as opposed to social) constructivism does not lack a theory of agency at all.
See also Haas and Haas, ‘Pragmatic Constructivism and the Study of International
Institutions’, (2002) 31Millennium 573.
110 Kostakopoulou, ibid. at 236^7.
111 See Gosepath, ‘Zur Begru« ndungen sozialer Menschenrechte’, in Gosepath and Lohmann
(eds), Die Philosophie der Menschenrechte, supra n. 37 at 146; and Tasioulas, supra n. 78.
112 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 70.
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of legislative, executive and judicial powers.113 In most cases, however,
post-national human rights institutions are only one-dimensional and very
often merely judicial, as in the case of the ECtHR. This is a consequence of the
material scope of application of these instruments that is limited to the activity
of national institutions. As a result, one may feel the influence of the national
conception of human rights protection on the internal organisation of
human rights institutions. This is exemplified, for instance, by von Bogdandy’s
contention that ‘the vision of reconstructing broad policy fields from the
perspective of human rights might in the long run even corrupt the concept
of a right as such, because the very essence of a right is that it is accorded
immediate protection by the courts’.114
Human rights competence
The second criterion for human rights institutional design is obviously a
core competence in human rights protection. Only an institution which can
place human rights at the core of its internal and external governance can
be deemed a human rights institution. This may in turn give rise to different
measures, whether human rights policy measures or more classical human
rights enforcement measures.
Global know-how
If a human rights institution that is organised as such is to be deemed a
post-national human rights institution, a third criterion needs to be added
that makes its post-national dimension specific. Post-national human rights
institutions can indeed play a role in human rights protection that is different
from that of national human rights frameworks and is complementary to them.
As such, their global know-how should be a crucial element of their design.
What is meant by global know-how is a constellation of instruments of
transnational and post-national trendsetting.
Publicity and transparency
A fourth criterion in the design of post-national human rights institutions
is their publicity and transparency. These imply good information and, in
principle, trigger deliberation, which is a crucial element of political legitimacy,
in conditions of reasonable pluralism and disagreement. Human rights are very
contestable objects and legitimacy of institutional decisions in this context
is therefore essential.
113 See, for example, Alexy, supra n. 37 on the complex institutional structure required by
fundamental rights protection at the State level.
114 von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1316.
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Democracy
A final criterion that is related to the previous one is democracy. Not only
should human rights institutions’decisions be transparent and public, but they
should also be democratic and include all those affected by these decisions in
the decision-making process. This inclusive nature is crucial to the legitimacy
of their decisions and democratic deficit is still one of the major difficulties
human rights institutions have to face. It would be a paradox indeed if those
institutions whose primary function is to protect fundamental rights did not
respect the ‘right of rights’, that of equal participation of all those affected in the
elaboration of their other rights.115
5. European Integration and Human Rights Protection
In this section, I would like to present evidence that the EU has the capacity to
become the first of a new kind of global human rights institution. Given the
copious evidence to the contrary and the manycritiques of the EU’s hypocritical,
defensive and negative approach to human rights, this statement obviously
calls for a global account of human rights protection in the EU and it
will be the purpose of this section to provide this, albeit in very general
terms.116 I will start by presenting recent breakthroughs in European human
rights practice, the objections it left unmet and the most recent evidence of
transformation in the area.
A. From Economic Integration to Human Rights Protection
The founding European Community (EC) Treaties did not refer to the protection
of fundamental rights and their first mentions in EC law pertained to economic
comparative advantages as in the case of equality between men and women and
anti-discrimination rights. Things started to change in the late 1960s when the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) began to rule that respect for such rights
was part of the legal heritage of the Community.117 This occurred in reaction
to national constitutional courts’ questioning of the primacy of European law
and their threats not to apply it as long as it did not provide sufficient protection
of fundamental rights at least equal to that provided by national constitutions
115 See Waldron, supra n. 78 at Chapter 11.
116 This section is largely inspired by Besson, supra n. 17.
117 See, for example, C-2/69, Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419; C-11/70, Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle fu« r Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125;
C-4/73, Nold v Commission [1974] ECR, 491; C-5/88,Wachauf v Federal Republic of Germany
[1989] ECR 2609; and C-260/89, ERT v DEP [1991] ECR I-2925.
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and international agreements.118 From then on, and this occurred gradually,
EU institutions and Member States violating human rights in application or
in derogation of an EU competence were deemed as violating the Community
legal order; the latter was said to contain non-written general principles
which entailed fundamental rights equivalent to, and inspired by, those in
the ECHR and Member States’constitutional traditions.
The belated and defensive nature of EU fundamental rights protection has
attracted numerous critiques and nourished deep scepticism about whether
the EU’s project of economic ordo-liberalism bears any relation to the project of
a human rights organisation.119 Human rights were indeed originally brought
in primarily to bind the EU and to protect national prerogatives in the area, and
not to extend EU competences in any way or to constrain Member States any
further.120 If Member States were bound by EU fundamental rights, it was not
in their own fields of competence and the EU had no business telling them how
best to protect human rights in their national sphere of competence. In fact,
due to the Member States’ resistance, there was, for a long time, no real proactive
human rights policy in the EU. It is only from the early 1990s that a progressive
consolidation of human rights protection started taking place both internally
and externally.
This occurred, internally, through the different layers of treaty revisions in
the Union starting with the first mention of human rights in the Preamble
of the Single European Act in1986.121 It continued with the adoption of Article 6
of the Maastricht Treaty,122 which was later amended and made justiciable in
Amsterdam. According to this Article, human rights are protected by the EU.
The Treaty of Amsterdam123 also introduced, in Article 7, the possibility to
deprive a Member State violating human rights of some of its rights under
the Treaty. Article 13 of the Consolidated Version of the Treaty establishing
the European Community (ECT)124 gives the EC a legislating competence in the
field of anti-discrimination law and has provided the legal basis for the 2000
anti-discrimination directives. In parallel to developments in primary law,
European institutions have gradually taken practical initiatives in different
areas of human rights protection since the early 1990s, in particular providing
measures against xenophobia or gender discrimination. In 2000, the EU
118 See, for example, the German Federal Constitutional Court’s decisions: Solange I BVerfGE
37, 271 (1974); Solange II BVerfGE 73, 339 (1986); and Brunner BVerfGE 89, 155 (1993).
119 See Coppel and O’Neill, ‘The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously’, (1992)
29 Common Market Law Review 669.
120 See von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1308: ‘If these endeavours succeed, human rights would
determine rather than simply limit the European legal system and would move to the
forefront of its institutions’activity.’
121 [1986] OJ L 169/1.
122 [1992] OJ C 191/1.
123 [1997] OJ C 340/1.
124 [2002] OJ C 325/33.
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adopted a non-binding Charter of Fundamental Rights, which expressly, albeit
non-exhaustively, guarantees rights inspired by the ECHR, Member States’
constitutional traditions and general principles of EC law. The Charter
may become binding as Part II of theTCE if it is ratified.125 The new Constitution
actually expressly places human rights at the core of the Union’s values and
objectives (Articles 2 and 3 of the TCE). Last but not the least, it authorises the
full accession of the EU to the ECHR in Article I-9 of the TCE; in so doing,
it clarifies the EU’s competence to accede which had previously been denied
on the basis of the EC Treaty by the ECJ’s 2/94 Opinion.126 In short, the constitu-
tionalisationprocess places human rights at theheart of European integration.127
True, this process seems to have come to a halt, but besides the latter being
foreseeably purely provisional and furthermore not being related to the constitu-
tionalisation of the Charter itself, there is growing evidence that human rights
nowhold a central position in European case lawand politics.
Externally, too, the EU has considerably increased its role in global human
rights protection since the early 1990s. This has been the case in the context of
economic agreements with developing countries, such as the 2000 Cotonou
Convention,128 which have inserted the encouragement and mainstreaming of
human rights considerations into development projects supported by the EU.
This increase in external human rights presence may also be illustrated in
the enlargement context and in particular by the European Initiative and
Programme in Democracy and Human Rights and by the Copenhagen criteria
for accession. More strikingly, the 2003 Athens Declaration reaffirmed the
need to commit the Union ‘to furthering respect for human dignity, liberty and
human rights’ and maintained that ‘we will continue to uphold and defend
fundamental rights, both inside and outside the European Union’.129 Finally,
Article III-193(1) of theTCE confirms that the Union’s action on the international
scene ‘shall be guided by, and designed to advance in the wider world, the
principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human
rights and fundamental freedoms . . .’. Even though many of these external
developments in the EU’s role in human rights protection can be traced back to
an economic rationale, the outcome is clearly positive and signals the EU’s
human rights awareness to the world.
125 For a detailed analysis of the implications of the constitutionalisation of the Charter for
fundamental rights protection in the EU, see Lawson, supra n. 9.
126 Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [1996] ECR I-1759.
127 See the Preamble of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in Part II, TCE: ‘It places the
individual at the heart of its activities, by establishing the citizenship of the Union and by
creating an area of freedom, security and justice.’
128 [2000] OJ L 317/43.
129 Athens Declaration made at the Athens Informal European Council, 16 April 2003, [2003]
OJ L 236, available at: http://www.eu2003.gr/en/articles/2003/4/16/2531/index.asp?.
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B. Two Critiques
These recent developments have been heavily criticised from a human rights
perspective. It is primarily the hiatus between the lack of extensive internal
human rights policy and proactive external actions in the field of human rights
protection that disturbs most observers. For instance, many Copenhagen criteria
for accession by newMember States are hardly respected by some of the current
Member States. It is therefore only by seeing the internal dimension of the
Union’s human rights policy as cut from the same cloth as its external dimension
that the latter can be truly successful and that the EU can avoid using double-
standards.130 According to Alston and Weiler’s famous 1999 report, ‘the Union
can only achieve the leadership role to which it aspires through the example
its sets to its partners and other States. Leading by example should become the
leitmotiv of a new EU human rights policy . . .’.131
Another critique pertains to the lack of clear competence of the EU in the field
of human rights, both internallyand externally. It is indeed a consequence of the
origins of the EU human rights regime that it is rather defensive and neutral, and
is meant to reinforce national competences in the area rather than curtail them
or give them new directions. Even the latest constitutionalised version of the
Charter reiterates in Article II-111 that it does not create a new EU competence
in the human rights field132 and that the Charter’s rights ought to be interpreted
in conformity with the ECHR and national constitutions’ rights in Article II-112.
This is also reiterated in Article I-9 of the TCE. In fact, the idea of the Charter
originated in Member States. It was not meant to extend existing guarantees,
but rather to delineate them more carefully and place them in the service
of national ones.133 To date, therefore, it is not clear whether the EU has a real
competence in the field of human rights.
C. Evidence of Transformation
All this does not, however, preclude the possibility of progress and institutional
reform. In fact, recent developments are evidence of the transformation of
the EU into a post-national human rights institution, that is to say one with
human rights at the core of its institutional framework, or at least evidence
of this potential transformation. Besides general evidence, I will also present
the development of European citizenship as a signal of the emancipation
of human rights protection in the EU.
130 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 85.
131 Alston andWeiler, supra n. 12 at 21^3.
132 On the case law that is at the origin of Article II-111,TCE, see Jacobs, supra n. 7.
133 See von Bogdandy, supra n. 2.
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(i) General
Evidence of a change in fundamental rights’ jurisdiction in the EU flows
indiscriminately from both internal and external elements in EU human rights
policies. First of all, the Charter’s denial of a new competence in the field of
human rights in Article II-111 is belied by the mention of positive duties of
Member States in the sameArticle. It is now widely accepted that human rights
do not only give rise to negative duties, but also to positive duties to make
sure these negative duties are respected. This applies, of course, to the EU,
but also to Member States when they apply or derogate from EC law. Thus, if EU
institutions can be held accountable to the EU for failing to respect their
positive duties of promoting the rights in the Charter (Article 51(1)), the EU’s
rule-making power has been extended in the field.134
Secondly, the scope ratione materiae of Articles 6 and 7 of the Amsterdam
Treaty is not clearly restricted to the application of EC law. This is exemplified
by the scope of analysis of the Independent Network of Experts established
by the European Commission in 2002 and which monitors human rights
protection in purely internal situations in Member States.135 This trend has
been confirmed recently with the Commission’s proposal for a Council
Regulation establishing a European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights
whose scope of action can, under certain conditions, go beyond the areas of
application of EC law.136 A third argument may be drawn from the fact that
some of the rights guaranteed by the Charter are rights which would never
find application within the material scope of EC law, such as the right to life or
the right to education.137
Finally, fundamental rights jurisdiction in the EU has recently been
extended to those decisions taken by Member States in the framework of other
international organisations and which affect their fundamental duties under EU
law. This was exemplified in particular by the Court of First Instance’s decision
in the Kadi and Yusuf cases, in which it grants itself the competence to check
United Nations Security Council resolutions for respect of jus cogens.138
Although the consequences of these cases are difficult to assess with precision,
and an appeal to the ECJ is currently pending, it clearly opens a new scope for
fundamental rights scrutiny in the EU.
134 See Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 980 and 993.
135 On the network, see: http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/cfr_cdf/index_en.htm.
136 COM(2005) 280 final. See, for different aspects of the Agency, Alston and de Schutter,
supra n. 4.
137 See Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 952.
138 T-315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission [2005] ECR II-0000; and T-306/01, Yusuf and Al
Barakaat International v Council [2005] ECR II-0000.
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(ii) The relationship between human rights protection and EU citizenship
A further hint of development may be found in the close relationship between
EU citizenship and human rights. Human rights and citizenship rights are
usually invoked as the two prongs of an irreconcilable point of tension between
the universalising human rights discourse and the particular, exclusive status of
political membership.139 The recent evolution of EU citizenship shows, however,
how post-national citizenship may evolve towards a more inclusive form of
political membership that is in line with human rights guarantees, both in
terms of its personal and material scope. This also demonstrates, I will argue,
how EU citizenship, in return, can help the EU human rights regime become
more universal and apply across the board in the EU and its Member States
outside the material scope of the EC Treaty and beyond the economic limits of
European integration (see, for example, Article 52(2) of the Charter).
Intrinsically related to the democratic ideal, the concept and regime of
EU citizenship was introduced by Articles 8 et seq. of the Maastricht Treaty to
palliate the democratic deficit of the EU. It was then slightly revised byArticles
17^21 of the Amsterdam Treaty, to reassure Member States and to emphasise
that EU citizenship does not replace national citizenship. According to
Article 17(1) of the ECT,‘every person holding the nationality of a Member State
shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall complement and
not replace national citizenship.’ Thus, EU citizenship depends on Member State
nationality. Since the conferral and withdrawal of Member State nationality
remain for each Member State to decide,140 this greatly limits the potential
impact of EU citizenship. Further, Union citizenship does not replace national
citizenship. EU citizenship should not therefore be confused with a European
form of nationality and is therefore conceptually uncoupled from nationality,
and should not be associated with a pan-European form of nationalism.
Article 17(2) of the ECT identifies EU citizenship with a legal relationship
between the EU and Member State nationals to which are attached specific
rights and duties. These correspond to all the rights and duties which already
derive from theTreaty and secondary legislation. As such, Articles 18^21 of the
ECT can be equated to a standstill clause that prevents the erosion of the acquis
communautaire. It also follows, however, that EU citizenship is evolutionary
and can expand to new rights together with the expansion of the scope of the
EC Treaty. The list of rights attached to EU citizenship in Articles 18^21mostly
recapitulates pre-existing rights, with the exception of the new political rights
in Articles 19 and 20. It is therefore quite piecemeal; it does not match lists
139 See Benhabib, The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004) at Chapter 4.
140 This was confirmed recently by the ECJ in C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette
Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] ECR I-9923.
348 HRLR 6 (2006),323^360
 at Universite de Fribourg on Septem
ber 19, 2011
hrlr.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
of national citizenship rights and is particularly thin in terms of political
rights. The citizenship rights expressly protected are the right of free movement
and residence within the territory of any Member State; the right to vote
and stand as a candidate at municipal elections and in elections to the
European Parliament in the Member State in which the citizen resides; the
right to diplomatic and consular protection by any Member State’s authorities
in third countries; and the right to petition the European Parliament and
to apply to the European Ombudsman. Most recently, the Charter has largely
reiterated these rights, but has also brought in a few new rights from the EC
Treaty, splitting some rights in two and extending the scope ratione personae
of most rights except political rights, in order to encompass third-country
nationals residing in the EU. Finally, the TCE guarantees EU citizenship
rights through the constitutionalised Charter in Articles II-99 to102 of theTCE
and, in a shorter form, in Article I-10 of theTCE.141
At first, European citizenship was heavily criticised as an empty promise
or pure rhetoric, and as an exercise in window-dressing of the underlying
market citizenship. In the meantime, and thanks to important jurisprudential
developments, EU citizenship has become a key element of the new European
polity which has a huge potential for the legitimacy of the global institutional
order.142 Thanks to the emancipation of EU citizenship, the material scope of
application of EU citizenship rights and the personal scope of EU citizenship
rights-bearers are indeed constantly expanding within the territory of the EU,
but also, as a consequence, outside the EU.
There was, for a long time, growing concern at the market-oriented nature of
EU citizenship and the material scope of application of citizens’ rights in the EU.
In principle, citizenship amounts to membership of a political community. As we
have just seen, however, most EU citizenship rights are economic rights attached
tomigrant workers, thus excludingmanyMember State nationals residing in the
EU and turning them into second-class citizens. Over the past five years or so,
the ECJ has developed the social elements of EU citizenship, thus making it a
source of rights of its own.143 This evolution has taken place primarily through
141 The following presentation focuses on the regime currently in force and does not refer to
the new constitutional dispositions.
142 See Shaw, ‘The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European Union’, (1997) 22
European Law Review 554; andWeiler,The Constitution of Europe: ‘DoThe New Clothes HaveAn
Emperor?’, and Other Essays on European Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) at 324 et seq.
143 See Eeckhout, supra n. 7; and O’Leary, ‘The Relation between Community Citizenship
and Fundamental Rights’, (1995) 32 Common Market Law Review 519. See also Advocate
General Jacobs in C-168/91 Konstantinidis v Stadt Altensteig Standesamt [1993] ECR I-1991
at para 46:
In my opinion, a Community national who goes to another Member State as a worker
or self-employed person under Articles 48, 52 or 59 of the Treaty is entitled not just to
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the combined reading of EU citizenship and anti-discrimination provisions,
and in particular of Article 18 of the ECT’s freedom of movement and residence
and Article12 of the ECT’s prohibition of discrimination on grounds of national-
ity. Through this connection, the case law finally expanded EU citizenship by
making it the fundamental status from which citizens may directly derive
individual rights, while also providing a more universal scope for protection
against discrimination in EC law. Until recently, for Article 12 to apply, one
needed to show that the issue at stake fell into the scope of application of
the Treaty. This implied falling into the scope ratione materiae of EC law and
required some involvement in an economic activity as a worker. Recent case
law has changed this and no longer restricts the respect of EU citizenship to the
scope ratione materiae of EC law.144
Another area of concern has been the status of third-country nationals in
the EU and their political exclusion. Their political rights remain generally
unrecognised with the exception of a few European countries. Since European
others, such as, for instance, German nationals in France or vice-versa, may, as
European citizens, take part in municipal and European elections in other
Member States, it is difficult to see why non-European others legally residing
in the EU could not benefit from the same rights. The solution is therefore
either to extend political rights of EU citizenship to third-country nationals
residing in the EU or to redefine EU citizenship as based on residence and not
on nationality. The latter approach would clearly be rejected by Member States
who fear for their national prerogatives. In any case, the recent tendency in the
case law and legislation seems to be the former, if one refers to the extension of
the scope of application ratione personae of some EU citizenship rights guar-
anteed in the Charter (Articles 41^45), with, however, the exception so far
of political rights. This also seems to follow from the recent harmonisation of
third-country nationals’ residence rights in the EU.145 The difficulty with this
pursue his trade or profession and to enjoy the same living and working conditions
as nationals of the host State; he is in addition entitled to assume that [. . .] he will be
treated in accordance with a common code of fundamental values [. . .]. In other
words, he is entitled to say ‘civis europeus sum’ and to invoke that status in order to
oppose any violation of his fundamental rights.
144 See C-85/96,Maria Martinez Sala v Freistaat Bayern [1998] ECR I-2691; C-184/99, Grzelczyk v
Centre Public d’Aide Sociale d’Ottignes-Louvain-la-Neuve [2001] ECR I-6193; C-413/99,
Baumbast v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-7091; and C-60/00,
Mary Carpenter v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-6279.
See also C-138/02, Brian Francis Collins v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2004]
ECR I-2703 C-456/02, Trojani v Centre publique d’aide sociale de Bruxelles [2004] ECR I-7573;
and C-200/02, Kunqian Catherine Zhu, Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, supra n. 140.
145 See Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, [2004] OJ L 158/77, and
Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term
residents, [2004] OJ L 16/44.
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approach is that it risks diluting the idea of political membership and the
exclusivity of rights citizenship guarantees, on the one hand, and creating
second-class citizens, on the other. A more inclusive and ‘bottom to top’
alternative might be to encourage Member States to facilitate the naturalisation
of third-country nationals residing on their territory and thus to extend the EU
political franchise. This actually corresponds to a recent tendency emerging
in certain Member States where foreigners’ political rights are gradually being
extended.
To sumup, EU citizenship is gradually emancipating its scope ratione materiae
from a purely legalistic and market-based conception of citizenship, and in its
scope ratione personae from an exclusive conception of post-national
political membership. Its recent evolution has shown how post-national
citizenship has turned into a more inclusive form of social and political
membership that is in line with universal human rights guarantees.
Accordingly, one may legitimately hope that EU citizenship can in return
help the EU human rights regime to become more universal in scope. If anti-
discrimination rights have helped extend the scope ratione materiae of
European citizenship, the latter may in return, as Eeckhout argues, help
extend the scope ratione materiae of EU fundamental rights in general. These
fundamental rights are still characterised by an economic emphasis and the
limits set by the EC Treaty. Thanks to the extension of their material scope,
they could be made to encompass any situation in which a European citizen
sees her rights violated, be it by the EU or a Member State, and whether this
takes place in the context of the application of EC law or not.146
6. Towards A Post-National Human Rights Institution
If there is evidence of a transformation of the EU into a post-national
human rights institution, it cannot replace more persuasive arguments for
the transformation and development of a true human rights competence of
the EU merely because it already appears to have taken place. To provide such
arguments, I will start by making an argument for the EU’s capacity in the
area based on the specificities of its human rights agency and by reference
to the institutional design criteria I have developed earlier. I will then address
different critiques, before finally making a few proposals for reform.
A. The Speci¢cities of Human Rights Agency in the EU
To make an argument for the EU’s capacity as a post-national human
rights institution, it is important to start with an argument for its role as
146 See Eeckhout, supra n. 7; and O’Leary, supra n. 143.
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a global justice agent. Then we will look into its more specific potential as
a human rights agent.
(i) The EU as a global justice agent
In a nutshell, there are three arguments one can make for the EU’s specific
capacity to contribute to a new justice order.147
First of all, the EU’s complex institutional structure and modes of
cooperation make it the most institutionally dense environment in the
international system. There are three main bearers of global justice
responsibilities in the EU. First of all, there is the EU polity itself, as a primary
agent of justice through its organs and inner institutions, such as the ECJ,
the Council (of Ministers), the Parliament and the Commission (albeit the latter
not in a direct way in terms of sanctions, but, for example, rather as an initiator
for various democratic and communicative processes and policies to draw
attention to human right issues within and outside the EU). There are the
Member States, which can play different roles as agents of European justice in
domestic or European affairs. The European model of competence allocation is
complex and Member States can be called upon to act on their own or together
with the EU. Finally, non-State agents as groups of individuals like NGOs, but also
other kinds of social and economic organisations like trade unions, can act as
human rights protectors.
Secondly, the EU’s miniaturised world helps it to crystallise and find solutions
to global problems within the EU. The EU has indeed managed to create a just
order among States without assuming away the plural nature of its polity and
its peoples. As such, the EU encourages State-like solidarity in a post-national
polity, thus creating the basis for a true global justice political order.148 This
in turn gives it a comparative advantage in shaping challenges at the
global level. Finally, not only does the EU have the institutional framework
and political know-how to promote a shift in the global agenda, but it has the
credibility among international actors to play such a role. This is of course
due to its crucial economic weight. However, its role as a civilian power in
development assistance and peace-building has also contributed to increasing
the EU’s global presence.
(ii) The EU as a human rights agent
To assess the EU’s capacity to become a post-national human rights institution,
it is important to go further and examine whether the EU’s institutional
organisation matches the criteria that were defined in the above discussion of
147 Nicola€|dis and Lacroix, supra n. 24 at 141^2.
148 Ibid. at 135.
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the design of human rights institutions. Not only does the EU fulfil them, but
it is characterised by specificities which make it a particularly potent institution
in the human rights protection context. As I explained before, institutional
design and evolution usually match new normative needs and this is clearly
the case in the human rights field, where new instruments are called for to
meet global challenges. The EU’s institutional specificities make it a particularly
able institutional framework to deal with the diversity of conceptions of human
rights in Europe; they give it a clear comparative advantage to other European
human rights organisations such as the Council of Europe or the Organisation
for Security and Cooperation in Europe.149
With respect to the internal organisation of the EU qua a post-national
human rights institution, it is clear that it differs from other similar institutions.
The EU is a multi-layered institution that encompasses, within the same political
and legal order lato sensu, its Member States’ internal institutions and European
internal institutions stricto sensu. Thus, human rights mechanisms apply not
only to national situations like other international human rights instruments,
but also to EUpolicies and actions.150 Additionally, the EU’s internal organisation
combines the scrutinyof legislative, executive and judicial powers and cannot be
reduced to the ECJ and judicial human rights scrutiny. This enables the EU to
have recourse to human rights enforcement mechanisms other than judicial
remedies, such as policy-making, mainstreaming151 or monitoring.152 This is
clearly the case of the proposed EU Fundamental Rights Agency whose mandate
will be to promote human rights compliance through political means. Moreover,
even within its judicial scrutiny powers, the EU uniquely combines different
layers of judicial control. National courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR all apply at
least some of the same human rights, within almost the same material scope
of application and over the same territory.153 This confirms the common image
of a ‘human rights laboratory’ to which some authors have been referring.154
The EU’s accession to the ECHR could only improve this cooperative relationship
149 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 77^8.
150 Eeckhout, supra n. 7 at 990.
151 See de Schutter, ‘Mainstreaming Fundamental Rights in the EU’, in Alston and de Schutter
(eds), supra n. 4 at Chapter 2.
152 See Alston and Weiler, supra n. 12 at 13. See also the essays in Alston and de Schutter,
supra n. 4 and, in particular, Chapter 1: de Burca, ‘‘‘New Modes of Governance’’ and the
Implementation of Fundamental Rights’.
153 On the complexity of the relationships between these different jurisdictional layers, see
Dutheil de la Roche' re, ‘Droits de l’homme: La Charte des droits fondamentaux et au-dela' ’,
Jean Monnet Working Paper 10/2001; and McCrudden, ‘The Future of the EU Charter of
Fundamental Rights’, Jean MonnetWorking Paper 10/2001.
154 See, for example,Weiler, ‘In Defence of the Status Quo: Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg’,
inWeiler and Wind (eds), supra n. 17, 7; and Pernice and Kanitz, ‘Fundamental Rights and
Multi-level Constitutionalism in Europe’,WHI Paper 7/04, available at: http://www.rewi.hu-
berlin.de/WHI/english.
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among human rights jurisdictions in Europe.155 This multi-level and cooperative
model of constitutional jurisdiction provides an exceptional jurisprudential
basis that other human rights organisations have lacked so far.156 It suffices to
refer to the recent case law of the ECJ, national supreme courts and the ECtHR
to realise the unique dialogue and cooperation they have generated.157
Secondly, as to the existence of a core competence in human rights
protection among other EU competences, we have seen before how the emer-
gence of a true competence underlying human rights policies and monitoring
may be observed in the EU. This has enabled the EU to start monitoring human
rights protection in purely national areas, for instance.158 It is important to
emphasise, however, that the emergence of such a competence need not imply
that human rights should be seen as a discrete and coherent area of European
law; human rights apply across different areas and need not be administered
by a centralised and specific human rights administration, contrary to von
Bogdandy’s critique.159
If a human rights institution like the EU is to be deemed a post-national
human rights institution, a third criterion needs to be added that makes its
post-national dimension specific: its global know-how. The EU occupies a
unique and powerful position in international affairs, thanks in particular
to its economic resources, that would help it deploy an effective human rights
policy.160 The fact that the EU is the largest donor of aid to the South and
the East and has a massive market capacity ensures that developing
countries feel pressured to abide by the human rights standards it establishes.
Moreover, through its aspiration to represent the peoples of Europe, the EU has
traditionally maintained a political perspective that is as external as internal,
and cannot therefore be accused of isolationism.161 Since institutional arrange-
ments and the related responsibilities in the EU have first been concentrated at
the transnational level, thus transcending the traditional transnational duties of
their Member States, the next step, shifting them one rung up the ladder of the
global institutional framework in Member States’ relationship to third countries,
seems almost natural. The externalisation of duties of justice from the realm
of a single polity to a multi-polity is already at play within the EU itself162 and
155 See Bribosia,‘La future Constitution: point culminant de la constitutionnalisation des droits
fondamentaux dans l’Union europe¤ enne’, in Magnette (ed.), La Grande Europe (Brussels:
Editions de l’Universite¤ de Bruxelles, 2004) 201; and Lawson, supra n. 9.
156 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
157 See, for example, Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland (2006) 42
EHRR 1; and BVerfGE, Gorgu« lu, BVerfGE, 2 BvR 1481/04 (2004).
158 See Alston and de Schutter, supra n. 4 at 5^6.
159 von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1311^2.
160 SeeWilliams, supra n. 12 at 78.
161 Ibid. at 78^9.
162 See Habermas and Derrida,‘What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea ForA Common Foreign
Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe’, (2003) 10 Constellations 291.
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this should increase the ability of the EU to promote human rights on the outside
as much as on the inside.
A fourth criterion in the design of post-national human rights institutions
is their publicity and transparency. Here too the EU presents specific qualities.
The EU offers important dialogical possibilities and its concern for public
debate, consultation, polls and transparency suggests it has the qualities ideally
required of a global justice framework.163 A final criterion that is related to
the previous one is democracy. The EU’s democratic regime, even if it is still
imperfect, distinguishes the EU from other international institutional regimes
and makes it particularly adept for its human rights protection function. Due to
the EU’s legitimacy crisis and its alleged democratic deficit, different measures
have been taken to improve the situation since the early 1990s, culminating
in the Constitutional Treaty’s chapter on democracy and other measures of
promotion of deliberation in the EU. In comparison with other human rights
institutions, the multi-layered and multi-faceted governance in the EU offers
greater channels of democratic accountability. For instance, the tensions
between the visions of the EU’s mandate in human rights issues between the
Commission, the Parliament and the ECJ have been productive over the
years164 and have no doubt led to recent breakthroughs in the area.
B. Some Critiques
Of course, one may doubt the ability of a primarily economic organisation to
turn into a human rights institution overnight. Different critiques have been
put forward, not always successfully, and it is important to address them in turn.
First of all, one should mention the critique that the EU does not have the
judicial apparatus it takes to protect human rights efficiently.165 This concern
relates both to the legal reasoning method, the level of scrutiny and the locus
standi in cases of human rights violation, and hence to the effectivity of judicial
human rights protection in the EU. Regarding the effectivity of judicial control,
one should, however, mention the guarantee in Article 47 of the Charter to the
right to an effective judicial remedy, and the new Article III-365 of the TCE’s
extension of the locus standi in the action for annulment.166 True, these few
improvements made by the Constitutional Treaty to locus standi in human
rights matters remain limited. However, human rights have recently become as
central to the ECJ’s case law as basic freedoms case law; there is no longer any
difference in quality between the two kinds of liberties in terms of scrutiny.167
163 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 77^8.
164 See, for example, Eeckhout, supra n. 7.
165 See, for example, Coppel/O’Neill, supra n.119; and DeWitte,‘The Past and Future Role of the
ECJ in the Protection of Human Rights’, in Alston et al. (eds), The EU and Human Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 859.
166 See Lawson, supra n. 9 at 29; and Bribosia, supra n. 155 at 208^10.
167 See, for example, C-112/00, Schmidberger vAustria [2003] ECR I-5659.
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Moreover, the full picture of fundamental rights protection in Europe cannot
be reduced to judicial protection in the EU. National courts’, the ECJ’s and the
ECtHR’s decisions should all be assessed together as key components of the
post-national judicial protection of fundamental rights in Europe. Finally,
judicial protection is not the only way in which human rights may be protected
at the post-national level, contrary to what the traditional liberal conception
of human rights holds.
Secondly, the EU’s non-judicial institutions are allegedly not sufficiently
autonomous from Member States’governments. In this sense, EU human rights
protection could not compare in independence with Member States’ protection
in terms of local assessment and interpretation. It would necessarily reflect
the opinion and interests of a majority of Member States at the detriment of
minorities in Europe.168 This might even contribute, according to some authors,
to transposing a neo-colonial way of thinking about European interventions to
the South and the East.169 Although it is true that Member States were the first to
demand human rights protection in the EU, human rights scrutiny in the EU has
quickly overcome the tight boundaries they had set for it, despite some Member
States’ recent efforts during the drafting process of the Charter.170 As we saw
before, for instance, human rights monitoring through some EUagencies applies
even in areas of strict national competence.
A third connected concern is the EU’s lack of independence from the
economic and corporate world. There is a paradox indeed in the reinforcement
of the EU’s ability to promote a human rights policy through its economic power.
While it is easy to understand how economic credibility can enhance
persuasion power, it may also pervert human rights in submitting them to
economic interests and an economically driven balance of interests.171 The
delicate balance between internal and external measures of human rights
protection has contributed, however, to strengthen human rights arguments
against economic interests. One may notice this, for instance, in the context
of anti-discrimination protection or of citizenship rights. This is exemplified at
best by the recent ECJ case law on conflicts between fundamental (economic)
freedoms and fundamental rights where fundamental rights are equal in the
balance and gradually take precedence.172 Moreover, it is crucial to understand
that the failure and contestation of traditional human rights organisations have
made it necessary to adopt a more adventurous stance towards future
institutional frameworks of global human rights protection.173
168 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
169 Ibid. at 80.
170 The 2000 Charter Convention’s President was Roman Herzog and his views regarding
German constitutional sovereignty were well-known.
171 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 79.
172 Recent examples are Schmidberger v Austria, supra n. 167 and C-36/02, Omega v
Oberbu« rgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn [2004] ECR I-9609.
173 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 86.
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A fourth objection relates to subsidiarity and the delicate balance between
Member States and the EU. According to von Bogdandy, the transformation of
the EU into a human rights institution would lead to the Europeanisation of
human rights competence and a uniformisation of human rights standards in
the EU which would disempower those very national authorities and standards
which are closer to fundamental rights violations and are hence in a better
position to judge them.174 At the moment, however, whenever there is an EU
competence, the allocation of duties of justice in the EU follows a complex
principle of subsidiarity that underlies a new model of cooperative sovereignty
in a post-national polity.175 The principle of subsidiarity was introduced in
European law byArticle 5(2) of the ECT. It has recently been consolidated in the
TCE (Article I-11 of the TCE) and an Additional Protocol on sovereignty, which
foresees different implementation mechanisms.176 It constitutes one of the key
principles of the division of competences in the EU; in the absence of exclusive
competence, European authorities can only take action when the objectives
of the proposed action cannot be satisfactorily attained by Member States,
and therefore have a better chance of being achieved by the Community.177
Accordingly, the bearers of duties in the EU are those who best respect
the human rights at stake in each concrete case in the whole territory of the
Union. Therefore, it is important to make sure that the transformation of the
EU into a human rights institution does not undermine, but, on the contrary
makes the most of, subsidiarity.178 This is characterised by the multi-level
network of institutions and the so-called human rights laboratory179 we are
experimenting with in the EU: where national courts, the ECJ and the ECtHR
contribute to the application of the same rights in Europe. This is very important
if one is to preserve diversity on controversial issues of values in Europe.180
174 von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1316^8.
175 See Besson, ‘Sovereignty in Conflict’, (2004) 8 European Integration On-line Papers, available
at: http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2004-015a.htm; and Besson, ‘The Taming of Sovereignty.
A Review of Neil Walker’s Sovereignty in Transition’, (2005) 3 International Journal of
Constitutional Law 147.
176 Follesdal, ‘Subsidiarity, Democracy, and Human Rights in the Constitutional Treaty of
Europe’, (2006) 37 Journal of Social Philosophy 61.
177 Despite the addition of the Subsidiarity Protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty and its
consolidation in the Constitutional Treaty (Article I-11), the principle has not yet had the
impact it deserves at EU level. See, for example, Estella, The EU Principle of Subsidiarity and
Its Critiques (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) at 6^7.
178 Compare von Bogdandy, supra n. 2 at 1319 who does not seem to think this is possible,
but whose proposal of a three-layered human rights protection system does not exclude
subsidiarity concerns in the third layer of human rights that includes EC institutions and
Member States when they apply EC law.
179 Pernice and Kanitz, supra n. 154.
180 See, for example, Keller and Bertschi, ‘Erfolgspotenzial des 14. Protokolls zur Europa« ischen
Menschenrechtskonvention’, [2005] Europa« ische Grundrechtszeitschrift 204; and Mu« ller,
‘Koordination der Grundrechtsschutzes in EuropaçEinleitungsreferat’, [2005] Revue de
droit suisse 9.
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Of course, constitutional conflicts can always occur among these different
levels of human rights protection.181 The European principle of coherence
constitutes, however, an interesting means to preserve a certain amount of
unity and continuity in diversity when these conflicts occur.182
Finally, the EU’s intervention in the human rights field might threaten the
work of other human rights organisations like the UN or the Council of
Europe.183 Although these international organisations are not flawless, they
have made a significant contribution to the advancement of human rights
since the Second World War. The emancipation of the EU in the human rights
context need not, however, imply the end of other institutions’ impact on
human rights protection in Europe. On the contrary, the competition and
cooperation of all institutions when they deal with the application of the same
human rights over the same territory and population ensure an enhanced
protection of these rights. It is important, however, to make sure European
mainstreaming of fundamental rights takes other instruments and institutions
sufficiently into account.184 Moreover, subsidiarity and respect for mutual
competence should be a guiding value, thus avoiding overloading certain
jurisdictions with competences of control they do not have. The recent ECtHR
decision in the Bosphorus case goes in that direction vis-a' -vis the ECJ,185 but
other decisions are also noteworthy such as the Court of First Instance’s decision
in the Kadi andYusuf cases, in which that Court grants itself the competence to
review UN Security Council resolutions on the basis of jus cogens.186 In any case,
human rights need not be seen as sufficiently protected by existing regional
and global institutions. There is, in fact, growing concern over the effectiveness
of traditional human rights institutions vis-a' -vis new actors and in new
multi-layered settings, as exemplified by the ECtHR’s backlog. This might
explain the renewed interest in the EU’s unique and complementary
institutional specificities in this respect.187
C. Scope for Reform
In view of these critiques, and despite their many shortcomings, it is important
to emphasise that the EU should transform itself even further if it is to become
a truly post-national human rights institution. Its human rights protection
181 See, for example, Spielmann, ‘Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg
Courts: Inconsistencies and Complementarities’, in Alston et al. (eds) supra n. 165, 758.
182 See Besson,‘From European Integration to European Integrity. Should European Law Speak
With Just One Voice?’, (2004) 10 European Law Journal 257.
183 See Williams, supra n. 12 at 80.
184 See de Schutter, supra n. 151 at Chapter 2.
185 Bosphorus HavaYollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v Ireland, supra n. 157.
186 Kadi v Council and Commission, supra n. 138.
187 Williams, supra n. 12 at 86.
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function is still in development, as exemplified by the current debates on
the constitutionalisation of the Charter and the implications of the
constitutionalised Charter.188
According to Williams, one of the first things the EU should improve,
to enhance its capacity of transformation into a human rights protection
institution, is its ability to conceptualise human rights independently from its
Member States.189 This need not, however, lead to the uniformisation of a
European human rights conception, as many authors like Weiler fear it
might,190 but rather to a levelling-up of national ones. This could be done, for
instance, through comparative constitutional law and judicial coherence
across the EU.191 In fact, this transformation is already taking place and one
Member State’s level of protection of human rights may from now on be taken
as the standard of the EU’s human rights protection, even though it is higher
than that of other Member States.192 Here lies the specific strength of the
EU human rights regime. It results, thanks to the principle of subsidiarity,
from a dialectic between EU guarantees and national traditions, and thus
avoids both the impoverishment of international unified guarantees and the
parochialism of diverse national ones.
Another area of necessary reform, now that EU competence in the human
rights field is becoming more precise, despite the absence of express competence
attribution, is the coherence one should aim at observing between human rights
protection outside the EU and internal levels of protection.193 An important
dimension of reform lies therefore in putting European internal and external
responsibilities in line with one another and hence addressing what Alston
and Weiler have referred to as ‘the element of schizophrenia that afflicts the
Union between its internal and external policies’.194 This applies as much to
the failures of internal policies compared with those of external policies as
to the reverse. Indeed, authors often concentrate on the gaps in internal policies
188 See, for example, Lawson, supra n. 9; and Dutheil de la Roche' re, supra n. 4.
189 Williams, supra n. 12 at 81^4.
190 See, for example, Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries’, in Neuwahl
and Rosas (eds), The European Union and Human Rights (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1995) 51.
See also Besselink, ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental Rights,
Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’, (1998) 35 Common Market Law Review
629; and Besselink, ‘The Member States, the National Constitutions and the Scope of the
Charter’, (2001) Maastricht Journal of European Law 68.
191 On the principle of coherence in European law, see Besson, supra n. 182.
192 See Omega v Oberbu« rgermeisterin der Bundesstadt Bonn, supra n. 172. See also Besson
and Pfersmann, ‘L’autorite¤ du droit constitutionnel compare¤ dans l’UE’, (2007) Revue
internationale de droit compare¤ [forthcoming] on the method and justification of compara-
tive constitutional law in the EU.
193 Williams, supra n. 12 at 85.
194 Alston andWeiler, supra n. 12 at 9.
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when compared with external ones, but sometimes external measures may have
to be adapted to more advanced internal ones.195
7. Conclusion
Five years ago, von Bogdandy provocatively raised the question whether the EU
was or could be what he referred to as a‘human rights organisation’. Since then,
countless arguments in favour of the EUdeveloping into a global or post-national
human rights ‘organisation’, ‘regime’or ‘framework’ have been brought forward.
Most of them rely on recent evidence of this transformation both in internal and
external European policies. They leave open, however, what should be under-
stood by a ‘human rights organisation’ and why the EU’s transformation into
this new kind of post-national human rights protection institution should be
deemed as valuable in the first place.
Based on global justice theories and a matching account of post-national
institutional design and also on essential insights into human rights theory,
this article has hopefully helped clarify the contours of what can be expected to
a post-national human rights organisation. On those grounds, it also aimed to
emphasise the unique capacity of the EU in that respect and the scope of the
human rights duties it now bears. True, numerous shortcomings may still be
identified with the EU’s prima facie economic take on human rights. The article
identified many of them, and made different proposals for reform to enhance
the EU’s unique capacity for human rights protection in Europe. Thus, not only
is the best yet to come, but the best ought actually to be coming in terms of
human rights protection in the EU.
195 Interestingly, for instance, while the degree of internal fundamental rights protection
is inferior to that of external fundamental rights protection, European citizenship rights
are better protected in the EU than the political rights of third-country nationals in EU
Member States.
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